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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Kellis appeals from his sentences for nine counts of lewd conduct with a 
minor under sixteen, two counts of sexual abuse of a child under sixteen, and 
one count of attempted lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedinqs 
A jury convicted Kellis, a thirty-nine year old Boy Scout camp staff 
member and school band instructor, of twelve felony counts relating to his sexual 
abuse of four children who were attending Camp Grizzly in Latah County during 
the summer of 2007. (PSI, pp.1-2; R., pp.129-134, 266-269, 289-293.) The 
district court imposed unified sentences of life, with fifteen years fixed, for each of 
nine counts of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen; twenty-five years, with 
fifteen years fixed, for each of two counts of sexual abuse of a child under 
sixteen; and fifteen years, with five years fixed, for one count of attempted lewd 
conduct with a child under sixteen, with all sentences to run concurrently. (R., 
pp.289-293.) Kellis timely appealed the sentences. (R., pp.298-300.) 
ISSUES 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, upon Mr. 
Kellis, unified sentences of life, with fifteen years fixed, for each of 
the nine counts of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen years of 
age; fifteen years, [sic] five years fixed, for the one count of 
attempted lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen years of age; 
and twenty-five years, with fifteen years fixed, for each of the two 
counts of sexual abuse of a child, with all counts to run 
concurrently? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Kellis failed to show that the district court violated his due process 
rights by imposing its sentence to punish Kellis for his continued assertion 
of innocence? 
2. Has Kellis failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 
imposing an excessive sentence? 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
ailedTotjSho~w ThatTheDistrict CowrtViolated--His-Due-Process - - . 
Riahts By lmposina Its Sentence To Punish Him For Exercisina His 
Constitutional Riahts 
A. Introduction 
Kellis contends that the district court improperly punished him for his 
continued assertion of innocence at trial and sentencing. (Appellant's brief, pp.5- 
8.) Kellis' claim, however, is without merit. The district court recognized the 
distinction between improperly punishing a defendant for exercising his 
constitutional rights, and the proper consideration of a defendant's lack of 
remorse and responsibility taken for his crimes as bearing on a defendant's 
rehabilitative potential. Kellis has failed to show a due process violation. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Appellate courts employ a bifurcated standard of reviewing due process 
claims on appeal, deferring to the trial court's factual findings but freely reviewing 
the application of the law to the facts found. State v. Schevers, 132 ldaho 786, 
788, 979 P.2d 659, 661 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Grav, 129 ldaho 784, 796, 932 
P.2d 907,919 (Ct. App. 1997). 
C. The District Court Did Not Improperly Punish Kellis For His Continued 
Assertion Of Innocence 
Due process prohibits a sentencing court from coercing a defendant into 
sacrificing the right to assert innocence by threatening a more severe sentence. 
State v. Lawrence, 112 ldaho 149, 157, 730 P.2d 1069, 1077 (Ct. App. 1986). 
However, a court is not completely restricted from utilizing continued assertions 
take responsibility in determining whether the defendant is a candidate for 
rehabilitation. State v. Murphy, 133 ldaho 489, 494, 988 P.2d 715, 720 (Ct. App. 
1999); State v. Brown, 131 ldaho 61, 72-73,951 P.2d 1288, 1299-1300 (Ct. App. 
1998); State v. Nooner, 114 ldaho 654, 655-656, 759 P.2d 945, 946-947 (Ct. 
App. 4988); State v. Sanchez, 117 ldaho 51, 52, 785 P.2d 176, 177 (Ct. App. 
1990) (The sentencing judge "need not ignore a persistent denial of wrongdoing, 
after guilt has been reliably adjudicated."). 
The district court in the present case clearly recognized this distinction. 
Several times during the sentencing hearing, the court emphasized that it was 
not punishing Kellis for the exercise of his constitutional rights, or for his 
continuing assertion of innocence: 
I can't hold it against you, Mr. Kellis, that you took this case 
to trial. There are a number of statements in the presentence that 
suggest that I hold it against you for exercising your constitutional 
right to testify. I don't think I can, as a judge, punish someone for 
the exercise of their constitutional rights. 
I don't think I can punish you for going to trial. I think I said 
that earlier. That's your constitutional right. If I were to punish 
people for going to trial, I don't think I would be doing my job. 
(Tr., p.1071, Ls.91-16; p.1074, Ls.6-9.) 
On appeal, Kellis expresses particular concern with the district court's 
statements to Kellis at sentencing that, "[ylou are not taking responsibility for the 
actions that you have been convicted of. And I can and do punish you for that," 
(Appellant's brief, p.7 (citing Tr., p.1071, Ls.17-19)) and "I guess, given the fact 
orse and have taken no responsibility, the easy 
question is whether I should impose a life sentence. I should impose a life 
sentence given that you haven't demonstrated any remorse and you haven't 
taken responsibility for any of these offenses" (Appellant's brief, p.8 (citing Tr., 
p.1073, L.24 - p.1074, L.4)). From these statements, Kellis concludes that the 
district court imposed indeterminate life sentences to punish him for exercising 
his consfitutional right to maintain his innocence. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-8.) 
However, a review of the applicable law and the record shows Kellis' claim to be 
without merit. 
To analyze claims of vindictiveness at sentencing on appeal, the ldaho 
Court of Appeals has adopted a "totality of the circumstances" approach, which 
requires an examination of the entire record. m, 131 ldaho at 72, 951 P.2d 
at 1299. The Court has specifically rejected the "per sen approach followed by 
several other jurisdictions, which requires that a sentence be vacated whenever 
a trial court made any singular comment that implied the defendant was being 
punished for exercising his rights to plead not guilty. a; State v. Reqester, 106 
ldaho 296, 299-200, 678 P.2d 88, 91-92 (Ct. App. 1984). The Court of Appeals 
has recognized instead that "a sentencing judge's references to the defendant's 
exercise of his right to trial, which would not pass a 'per se' test, might not reflect 
actual vindictiveness." Reqester, 106 ldaho at 300, 678 P.2d at 92. 
In m, the ldaho Court of Appeals reviewed the totality of the 
circumstances and the context of the district court's sentencing hearing 
statements that appeared, in isolation, to imply improper punishment. The Court 
'strict court's sentencing comments: 
Had you admitted your guilt at some point in this [clourt 
proceeding, you had an excellent chance, having acknowledged 
responsibility for these acts of having the benefit of the Cottonwood 
program. And you had that opportunity all the way up to just a few 
moments ago and you have not taken responsibility for these acts 
and you've had repeated opportunities to do so. You want to 
maintain your innocence, that's fine. The evidence shows 
otherwise. And you have to suffer the consequence. You have to 
learn that it's not just one thing to abuse a young lady, it is another 
thing to abuse the justice system. I find that you have abused the 
justice system and you are paying a consequence because of that. 
m, 131 ldaho at 72-73, 951 P.2d at 1299-1300. 
The ldaho Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence, noting that "[olur 
review of the record adds a good deal of context to the statements made by the 
court." Id- at 73, 951 P.2d at 1300. The Court found that this context revealed 
that the district court's comments about taking responsibility did not express 
vindictiveness, but merely the court's conclusion that because Brown was not 
willing to accept responsibility for his actions, he was not a good candidate for 
rehabilitation through the retained jurisdiction program. Id. 
Similarly, in the present case, an inspection of the entire context of the 
district court's comments reveals that the court properly considered Kellis' refusal 
to take responsibility for his actions, and this failure's relationship to Kellis' 
rehabilitative potential. Prior to the comments Kellis takes issue with on appeal, 
the district court recognized that without taking responsibility for his crimes, Kellis 
would not be successful in sex offender treatment: 
I'm no expert on sex offense, but I can tell you that in talking 
to people who treat sex offenders, the most important criteria is 
empathy. You have to be able to appreciate what you've done and 
to appreciate the position that you've put these young boys in. And 
unless and until you develop empathy for the victims of these 
e that you will ever be released 
I've dealt with the Probation and Parole Commission on 
other cases, and I have no expectation that you will be released 
from the penitentiary until the Parole Commission concludes that 
you have rehabilitated yourself. And rehabilitation will require, as a 
first step, that you recognize what you did wrong and that you 
empathize with your victims and you appreciate what you've done 
to them. And until you do that, my expectation is that you will be 
incarcerated in the State of Idaho. 
(Tr., p.1069, L.12-p.1070, L.1). 
Later the district court reiterated: 
I think it's a similar analysis to the last criteria that when you have 
no remorse and no empathy for your victims, I don't have much 
optimism that you can or will rehabilitate yourself. And if you can't 
rehabilitate yourself, then I don't have much hope that another 
crime isn't [sic] unlikely. 
(Tr., p.1073, Ls.17-22.) 
The context of the district court's comments reveals that it properly 
considered Kellis' failure to take responsibility for his crimes as relating to Kellis' 
rehabilitative potential. The court plainly recognized that without this necessary 
first step, rehabilitation attempts would not be successful. Kellis has failed to 
establish a violation of his due process rights. 
Kellis claims that, even if the district court did not violate his due process 
rights by considering his lack of remorse and failure to accept responsibility for 
his crimes, it nevertheless abused its discretion because, he contends, the 
court's "statements crossed the line from seemingly appropriate considerations 
about rehabilitative potential to punishment for the act of exercising his right to 
remain silent." (Appellant's brief, pp.5-8.) This claim fails for two independent 
reasons. First, Kellis cites no authority for the proposition that a claim of 
vindictiveness at sentencing implicates the district court's discretion, and as 
such, has waived consideration of this argument on appeal. State v. Zichko, 129 
ldaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). Second, contrary to Kellis' assertion, 
claims of sentencing vindictiveness do not implicate a district court's discretion. 
See Reaester, 106 ldaho at 300, 678 P.2d at 92 ("D/V]e do not view the 'totality of -
circumstances' rule as an invitation for an appellate court to weigh the sentence 
against the entire record to treat the vindictiveness issue as merely a question of 
abuse of sentencing discretion.") Rather, to succeed on a claim of vindictive 
sentencing a defendant must show a violation of due process, i.e., that the 
sentencing court actually "intent[ded] to punish him for exercising his right to trial 
in imposing sentence." Id. at 299, 678 P.2d at 91. Having failed to even allege a 
due process violation, much less demonstrate one from the record, Kellis has 
failed to show any basis for reversal. 
The totality of the circumstances and review of the entire record reveals 
that the district court considered Kellis' failure to take responsibility, and his lack 
of remorse, in the proper context of his lack of rehabilitative potential. Kellis has 
failed to show that the district court violated his due process rights by considering 
his failure to take responsibility and lack of remorse as factors bearing on its 
sentencing decision. 
11. 
Kellis Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Imposing An Excessive Sentence 
A. Introduction 
Kellis contends that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an 
excessive sentence. (Appellant's brief, pp.4, 8-10.) Considering any reasonable 
view of the facts, however, Kellis has failed to establish that the district court 
abused its discretion in imposing concurrent unified life sentences with fifteen 
years fixed for each of nine counts of lewd conduct of a child under sixteen, and 
lesser concurrent sentences for three additional felony sex abuse counts. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review 
only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 ldaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
397, 401 (2007). The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the 
sentencing court abused its discretion. Id. 
C. The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion In Imposina Its Sentence 
To determine whether the trial court abused its sentencing discretion, an 
appellate court independently reviews "all the facts and circumstances of the 
case," and considers the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. 
State v. Cope, 142 ldaho 492, 500, 129 P.3d 1241, 1249 (2006). To prevail, the 
appellant must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the 
sentence is excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment. Icf. 
Those objectives are "(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing." State v. Cross, 132 ldaho 667, 671, 
978 P.2d 227, 231 (1999) (internal citations omitted). ldaho Code § 19-2521 
further provides criteria a district court must consider before it sentences a 
defendant to imprisonment. 
The district court expressly considered each of these factors in imposing 
its sentence. (Tr., p.1068, L.12 - p.1073, L.24.) The district court's thorough and 
methodical sentencing analysis included consideration of the risk of reoffense. 
the possibility of rehabilitation, the nature and seriousness the crimes, 
deterrence; Kellis' criminal history, the harm caused by the crimes, Kellis' lack of 
remorse and failure to take responsibility for his crimes, whether provocation 
played a part in the crimes, the existence of any grounds tending to excuse or 
justify the conduct, whether the conduct of the victims induced or facilitated the 
commission of the crimes, restitution issues, and Kellis' character and attitude. 
(Id). The court ultimately determined that a lengthy period of incarceration was 
necessary to protect society and impress upon Kellis the seriousness of his 
crimes. (Id.) Contrary to Kellis' assertion on appeal, the record supports the 
sentence imposed. 
The nature of Kellis' crimes and the profound impact they had on his 
victims and their families warranted the district court's sentence. Over a period 
of approximately two months during the summer of 2007, Kellis violated the trust 
of his victims and committed twelve egregious felony sex abuse crimes. 
A.G., the fifteen-year-old victim of the crimes charged in counts Vlll and IX 
of the indictment, testified that Kellis came into his tent at night and touched him 
"in the penis area," and that Kellis repeated this conduct "every other night or so." 
(R., pp.130-131; Tr., p.373, Ls.6-9; p.387, L.14 - p.388, L.24.) A.G. also 
described an occasion when he was working in the area of the camp's shotgun 
range, when Kellis asked him to sit on his lap. (Tr., p.393, L.19 - p.395, L.19.) 
When A.G. did so, Kellis unzipped A.G.'s shorts and touched him in the "penis 
area," under his clothes. (Tr., p.395, Ls.19-21.) Shortly after, Kellis unzipped 
A.G.'s shorts again, pulled them down, and performed oral sex. (Tr., p.395, 
Ls.21-25.) 
S.O., the fifteen-year-old victim of the crimes charged in counts I-IV and XI 
of the indictment, testified that while he was watching a movie, Kellis entered the 
room, sat next to him on a sofa, and rubbed his upper leg and stomach for 
approximately ten minutes. (R., pp.130-131, 134; Tr., p.439, Ls.8-11; p.452, L.8 
- p.453, L.16.) Later that night, Kellis came into S.O'.s tent, pulled down S.O.'s 
underwear, touched his penis, and performed oral sex. (Tr., p.457, L.20 - p.458, 
L.14.) The next week, Kellis returned to the tent, again inappropriately touched 
S.O. and performed oral sex, and attempted to force S.O. to perform oral sex on 
him. (Tr., p.460, Ls.11-16.) During a third incident, Kellis attempted to have anal 
sex with S.O., until A.G., who was also in the tent at the time, woke up. (Tr., 
p.461, Ls.1-21.) 
D.C., the sixteen-year-old victim of the crime charged in count X of the 
indictment, testified that while he was cleaning the shotgun storage shed, known 
as the "toaster," Kellis put his hands in DC's undenvear and touched his penis. 
(R., p.133; Tr., p.500, Ls.19-22; p.512, L.9-p.515, L.5.) 
J.S., the fifteen-year-old victim of the crimes charged in counts V-VII and 
XI1 of the indictment, testified that Kellis came into his tent at night, laid down, 
touched J.S.'s penis, and told him "I want some," and "I'll make you feel good." 
(R., p.131-132, 134;Tr., p.549, Ls.10-13; p. 564, L.22-p.566, L.1.) J.S. testified 
that Kellis came into his tent every night for approximately the last five weeks of 
the summer. (Tr., p.566, L.24 - p.567, L.6.) On another occasion, when J.S. 
was alone with Kellis on the shotgun range near the "toaster" storage area, and 
requested that Kellis let him shoot, Kellis responded that "you have to have 
toaster time." (Tr., p.567, L.23 - p.568, L.4.) In the storage area, Kellis told J.S., 
"drop your pants, then you can shoot the shotgun." (Tr. p.568, Ls.5-8.) J.S. did 
so, and Kellis touched his penis. (Id.) 
While Kellis did not have a prior criminal conviction at the time of his 
sentencing, he did have a pending charge of rape of a child in the 2"d degree in 
Asotin County, WA. (PSI, p.14.) In addition, the present case, and its twelve 
associated felony sex abuse crimes, itself constitutes a continuing course of 
conduct and a substantial and troubling criminal history. The sheer quantity of 
the incidents with multiple victims over a relatively short period of time is striking. 
Kellis spent much of the summer of 2007 preying on boys at Camp Grizzly. 
Despite the serious and repeating nature of his crimes, and the multiple 
victims he abused, Kellis greatly benefitted from his sentences being imposed 
concurrently. For his twelve felonies, Kellis faced up to nine consecutive life 
sentences, and a further consecutive seventy-five year term. I.C. §§ 18-1506; 
18-1508; 18-306. Kellis is extremely fortunate to instead be eligible for parole 
after a mere fifteen years. 
At sentencing, the district court discussed how Kellis "violated the trust 
that was placed in [Kellis] by the Boy Scouts." (Tr., p.1068, Ls.22-24.) The court 
noted how "[tlhose four young boys were obviously harmed in ways that are 
unspeakable." (Tr., p.1071, Ls.9-10.) In recalling the victim impact statements 
presented prior to sentencing, the court noted that it was "moving to hear parents 
talk in terms of the effect your acts have had on their lives, not just their sons' 
lives." (Tr., p.1070, ls.10-13.) The pre-sentence investigator concluded that 
"collateral information as well as victim statements reveal that Mr. Kellis used his 
authority as a teacher and camp counselor as a way of grooming andlor 
intimidating his victims and there appears to be an established pattern of sexual 
abusive behaviors with Mr. Kellis towards his young victims." (PSI, p.21.) 
Considering any reasonable view of the facts as applied to the proper 
sentencing criteria, and the district court's analysis, Kellis has failed to establish 
that the district court abused its discretion by imposing the aggregate unified life 
sentence with fifteen years fixed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Kellis' sentence. 
DATED this 20th day of October 2009. 
"k4 *. 04 
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